In the beginning of January 1945 a special meeting between the Politburo of BCP and the Politburo of CPSU took place. We then heard a special exposé for the first time (G. Malenkov) of Stalin's cult of personality and and its harmful effects. And we were warned to learn a lesson for ourselves from their, the CPSU's, experience. The meeting took place by the Soviet comrades' suggestion. On the Soviet side the meeting attended Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin. On our side - Rayko Damyanov, Georgi Chankov, and I. We did not know in advance what we were invited to a meeting in Moscow for. G. Malenkov was then prime minister and simultaneously led the work of the Politburo. He gave the word to Khrushchev - then first secretary of the Central Committee. Khrushchev, holding in his hand a voluminous scroll of typewritten text and looking at it from time to time, spoke about some negative phenomena in our, the BCP's, work. They, the Soviet people, had realized that these phenomena were not ours, the BCP's own creation, that they, these negative phenomena, were adopted from them ("The patent is not yours, the patent is ours" - stated Malenkov), but their experience indicates that measures should be taken to eliminate these negative phenomena. Khrushchev presented, I repeat, often looking in the folder with the material prepared by the international department of the Central Committee (B. Ponomarev), facts about the existence of a cult of personality in our Party. Of course, none of the gatherers of these facts had spoken with us in advance. We were told, for example, that my name is often and continuously chanted at meetings and demonstrations; that in some places busts of me are being exhibited; that we convene plenums of the Central Committee on a much larger scale, attracting a large number of responsible activists; that in the summer of 1953 I was in Euxinograd for more than two months and I led from there; that at one of the plenums I sharply criticized the old Party member Rada Todorova; and other accusations - I don't remember everything - about mistakes made in our internal party life. Already at the meeting, and until now, I feel a doubly feeling; on one hand, we clearly and necessarily had to draw a lesson from the experience of the CPSU, to correct a number of things in our praxis that resulted from the conviction that everything, absolutely everything, that is done in the CPSU is mandatory for us as well; to realize what we must reject, although until now we have considered it an indefeasible orthodoxy and blindly believed in it, although no one anywhere in the CPSU questioned it until yesterday. In this regard, I will speak for myself honestly: I was ready to do whatever was necessary. But I will also say that I have not been involved in instilling a cult of my personality for myself, I have opposed the buzz around my name. On the other hand, the way facts were presented to us by Khrushchev, most of which were our internal affairs, still cause me grief. I'll say it directly: this way [they spoke in] was insulting to us. We were summoned to Moscow to be reprimanded for nothing else, but because, it seems, we have not yet understood that for our aspiration, for our diligence, we should learn from everything that the CPSU does, from what the CPSU represented under Stalin's leadership, we will answer for ourselves, we will pay for ourselves! But why did Khrushchev have to scold us so unceremoniously on issues that are absolutely our own business: how many people does the plenum of the Central Committee consist of, who and how we criticize, where did I spend my summer vacation and how long did it last (by special decision of the Politburo!) etc. The price of this scolding was seen later, when the same Khrushchev convened plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU with 12,000 participants in Luzhniki in Moscow, led the Central Committee of the party from Yalta, from Sochi during the summer months, criticized without appeal members of the Politburo and so forth and no one lined him up to lecture him! Generally, our meeting with representatives of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU seemed to us not like a comradely, natural guidance, like fraternal help from those whose words and deeds we have been brought up to trust boundlessly, with whom we have merged our destinies; not as help to get rid of some negative layers adopted by them, from their praxis, until recently considered absolutely correct and defended by all of us - the meeting seemed like a mentor's moral teaching, like a rough scolding of the first-graders by the strict and merciless, but not infallible himself teacher. Khrushchev did not watch the tone of his words. I also couldn't hide my astonishment and disturbance at the manner in which we were being lectured. The Soviet comrades sensed this. Maybe that's why, when we were walking away after the meeting, Bulganin hugged and kissed me, trying to say "don't be upset, you will fix the flaws in your work, we know that, don't take it all too seriously". There were occasions when I was personally present when Stalin drew our attention to certain aspects of our work, advised us, but always calmly, actually in a comradely manner. Such a way of addressing us, such, to put it mildly, a mentoring tone, like that of Khrushchev in this meeting, which is now being discussed here, Stalin never exhibited. As soon as I returned to Bulgaria, I held two public meetings against the practice of the cult of the individual, I pointed out the harm of it, I pointed it out specifically, taking into consideration our reality and myself personally. These speeches were printed and distributed in the party and throughout the country. Any busts in question disappeared. Chants and buzz - simply prohibited. At my suggestion, we abolished the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee by decision of the Politburo. I continued to manage the affairs of the Politburo by a special decision made by the Politburo. Inside the Politburo, opinions were heard that I had gone too far in this regard, that the criticism leveled at us in relation to our work was not entirely justified and acceptable, that no one required such self-criticism from us. They meant my two (self-critical) speeches against the practice of the cult of the individual. Despite this, no complications arose in our management on the occasion of the meeting held in Moscow. The 6th congress of the party was recently held and passed unanimously. And we considered - all without exception - that we had learned the necessary lessons from the experience of the CPSU, that we were keeping pace with it in the new situation that had arisen after Stalin's passing. Of course, we were not far from any thought of casting doubt, even more - denying Stalin's entire activity and historical knowledge. We could not at that time guess, let alone assume, that two years later the leadership of the CPSU would come out with N. S. Khrushchev's report in the closed session of the 20th Congress, with which report - I'll just say, a clumsy report - he "debunked" Stalin. As for the cult of his (Stalin's) personality, all the blame fell on Stalin himself and the responsibility of this "cult" of his, including Khrushchev himself, who in fact created and inflated it himself, was passed over with deep silence. The criticism of improper methods, improper style of work in the leadership of the party began after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, after our delegation returned to Sofia. This criticism developed at the April plenum of the Central Committee. Here it gained full momentum, but not as a criticism of the shortcomings of the entire leadership that I had until then headed, not as a self-criticism of the party leadership, considering its activity in the light of the statements of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, but as a criticism directed exclusively against me, who had myself created in the leadership of the party, in the party itself, the exact same environment, methods, and style of work that existed in the leadership of the CPSU under Stalin. On the eve of the April plenum, and especially at the plenum itself, all members of the Politburo - some more sharply, some more discreetly - took the position that the cult of Stalin was very strongly developed in our party; that in our leadership and in the party a cult of my personality had been inculcated and improper, vicious methods of work and leadership were associated with it, which had held back our progress; that all guilt and responsibility is exclusively mine. There were also opinions that there was a cult of personality - in the form of certain elements - also under G. Dimitrov, but the cult blossomed along all lines in my person. Of course, none of those who claimed this tried to raise the question of how it could happen that for years in a row, nowhere in the Party (not to mention the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo!) did not show a signal of such great unhappiness in it, in its leadership; that, on the contrary, until yesterday everyone in one voice, and especially in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party, supported and carried out the style and methods of work that they now vehemently condemn as the style and methods inculcated by only one person! Where was the Central Committee, the Politburo, to grab such an evildoer by the ears and give the Party the opportunity to develop in full swing?! Did I do right in accepting the almost ruthless criticism leveled against me by those who, for seven years, did not speak a single word to point out any weaknesses or infirmities in my work, but swore that everything was going well?... I think I did the right thing. And under no circumstances do I regret it. But I will never forget the words of G. Dimitrov, which he said to me, if I am not mistaken, in 1948: "Beware of those who praise you a lot." It is my fault that I have not seen or have misjudged the cunning, unhealthy displays of some of those I have worked side by side with. I must say that the one-sided, clumsy, abrasive, short-sighted, "revealing" criticism of Stalin's activities at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the day after it was delivered in the session closed to the representatives of the foreign communist and workers' parties, was provided to these representatives in writing for their perusal - I must say that this "report" was a complete shock to me, it threw me off balance, I could not understand and take in what I read. Agree [with me] that when during the course of nearly thirty years you have perceived something as a pure, absolutely pure truth, you have believed in something with all your soul, you have cultivated in yourself an unshakable and holy respect, how can you once turn like a spinning top in the opposite direction?! I had to spit in my soul or endure them to spit in it - no, that I could neither understand nor do. I could take on myself any responsibility, crucify myself if necessary, but spit in my soul - no! All this could not not affect me as the person responsible for the work of the Politburo. Instead of quickly taking the decision to convene a plenum of the Central Committee to report the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the conclusions for us from these decisions (lessons) for our party, expanding and developing further what I have said and written against the practice of the cult of personality in 1954-55, and which we had practically done (carried out) for two years, I had fallen into a particularly stricken state, a state of disturbance, I pushed on to take the initiative to convene a plenum of the Central Committee, somehow I was gathering my strength, I could not yet take a breath, so to speak, from the theatricals of the 20th Congress of the CPSU about Stalin, we were arguing in the Politburo until one day - it was at the beginning of March 1956 - we received an invitation from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to go - our entire Politburo - to Moscow to meet and talk with him. The invitation was delivered by phone by Mikhail Suslov to me and T. Zhivkov. Suslov conveyed to us the request that our Politburo go to Moscow for a meeting with the Soviet comrades who wanted to talk with us, because they were worried that we - not knowing all the facts - would make mistakes when solving our questions. This request, as I said, was handed over to me, obviously, as prime minister, and to T. Zhivkov - as first secretary of the Central Committee, if not now factually, then in the future. It meant that our issues would be resolved in Moscow. And that's exactly what happened.