This was unhelpful, because an excessively high “angle of attack,” as it is known, can cause an aerodynamic stall - suddenly robbing the wings of lift and causing the plane to lose altitude.Boeing’s engineers developed a control system called MCAS - Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System - to ensure that the way the 737 Max behaved in the air remained consistent and matched that of previous generations of the plane.
This piece of software brings the nose of the aircraft down automatically, under very specific circumstances, without the intervention of the pilot.Investigations into both 737 Max crashes are still under way, but the finger of suspicion has already been pointed firmly at MCAS.MCAS worked in the background, and it wasn’t until after the Lion Air crash that Boeing explained what it was and how it could be deactivated. It was not specifically mentioned in the flight manual - which is meant to give pilots the information they need to fly the aircraft safely.So what were the circumstances in which it was certified as safe to fly in the first place - and why was it not grounded when that flaw first came to light?
Many analysts are now pointing the finger at the close, even symbiotic, relationship between the company and the regulator responsible for aviation safety in the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).The charge being levelled against the FAA is that it was a victim of so-called “regulatory capture”.
This is what happens when a government agency’s relationship with the industry it oversees becomes too close for comfort; instead of acting primarily in the interests of the public, it puts the needs of businesses first.
The FAA was responsible for certifying the 737 Max and giving it permission to fly.In the rush to produce the new aircraft, richard blumenthal argued, critical safety features had been disregarded.On 11 March, the day after the Ethiopian Airlines flight 310 crashed, the FAA published a “continued airworthiness notification”, which in effect gave the aircraft the green light to continue flying.China’s civil aviation authority was one of the first to order the grounding of the plane, along with Ethiopia, just a day after the accident. Many others followed suit.
But it was not until 13 March that the FAA itself banned the plane from flying.Meanwhile, former Boeing safety engineer Dr Todd Curtis, who now runs the website Airsafety.com, says the system does create a potential conflict of interest because work on behalf of the FAA is carried out by people who receive their pay cheques from the aerospace giant. But he insists he personally never saw any behaviour that gave cause for concern.
In the case of the 737 Max, critics believe that in its desperation to get the aircraft on to the market, the potential dangers of the MCAS system were not explored thoroughly enough - and the FAA failed to step in.
“Because Boeing knew whatever they did, and whatever they submitted [to the FAA], it was going to be certified. So, they got sloppy. Or sloppier,” says Mary Schiavo.Reports of air crashes are invariably harrowing - but they are also extremely rare. Last year, there was one fatal accident for every 2,520,000 flights, according to the Aviation Safety Network